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While the digital layer of social interaction continues to evolve, the recently proclaimed
hopes in the development of digital identity could be both naïve and dangerous.
Rather than just asking ourselves how we could digitize existing features of identity
management, and corresponding financial transactions on a community or state level,
we submit that truly useful and innovative digital identities need to be accompanied
by some significant rethinking of the essential basics behind the organization of the
world. Once digital technologies leave the realm of purely online or deeply local projects,
the confrontation with the world of citizenship’s biases and the random distribution of
rights and duties precisely on the presumption of the lack of any choice and absolute
pre-emption of any disagreement comes into a direct conflict with all the benefits
Distributed Ledger Technology purports to enable. Some proponents of Distributed
Ledger Technology-based identity systems envisage “cloud communities” with truly
“self-sovereign” individuals picking and choosing which communities they belong to. We
rather see a clear risk that when implemented at the global scale, such decentralized
systems could be deeply harmful, reinforcing and amplifying the most repugnant aspects
of contemporary citizenship. In this contribution, we present a categorization of existing
digital identity systems from a governance perspective and discuss it on the basis of
three corresponding case studies that allow us to infer opportunities and limitations of
Distributed Ledger Technology-based identity. Subsequently, we put our findings in the
context of existing preconditions of citizenship law and conclude with a suggestion of
a combination of several tests that we propose to avoid the plunge into a neo-feudal
“brave newworld.” We would like to draw attention to the perspective that applying digital
identity without rethinking the totalitarian assumptions behind the citizenship status will
result in perfecting the current inequitable system, which is a move away from striving
toward justice and a more dignified future of humanity. We see the danger that those
might be providedwith plenty of opportunities who already do not lack such under current
governance structures, while less privileged individuals will witness their already weak
position becoming increasingly worse.
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INTRODUCTION
The World Bank set up an Identification for Development
program (ID4D) in 2014 (World Bank, 2018, p. 1). In the
2018 report of this program, it is claimed “that an estimated 1
billion people globally face challenges in proving who they are
because they lack official proof of their identity. As a result, those
people struggle to access basic services—including healthcare,
education, financial, and mobile services—and may miss out on
important economic opportunities, such as participating in the
digital economy or formal employment” (World Bank, 2018, p.
3). Accordingly, the World Economic Forum (WEF) established
a “Platform for Good Digital Identity” at the beginning of
2018 (WEF, 2018a). While this initiative remarkably focuses on
“good” identities with the objective to “ensuring that everyone
can participate in the digital society through identity and access
mechanisms” (WEF, 2018b, p. 8), the question of technological
feasibility remains largely open. It seems promising to explore,
however, the role Blockchain and other Distributed Ledger
Technologies (DLT; including Ethereum, IOTA, Hyperledger
and others) could play in underpinning such systems of fully
or at least largely decentralized identification (Verhulst and
Young, 2018, pp. 30–31; Wagner et al., 2018)1. In a report from
December 2018, the WEF presented research estimating that,
by 2022, 150 million people will have “blockchain-based” digital
identities (WEF, 2018b, p. 17). Additionally, the market for
identity verification is projected to be between 16 and 22 billion
dollars (Pike and Dickson, 2018). Much of this discussion and the
associated hopes focus on enhancing the capabilities of inefficient
identification systems in the Global South, as well as aiding
structurally suppressed groups within developing countries. As
is typically the promise when it comes to digitization in public
administration (Fleer, 2018, pp. 1350–1354), DLT-based systems
should be able to make public services more efficient. For
developed countries, this can mean that it is quicker, more
convenient for the citizen, and more cost-effective to provide
them. For developing countries, however, the promise is that it
is possible to provide “proper” public administration in many
areas for the first time. In the context of how the use of innovative
technology can aid in bridging the gap between the global north
and south, the term “leapfrogging” is used (Parry, 2011), and it
is not difficult to imagine such disruptive strides could be made
in the area of digital identity once DLT systems are applied in
large scale.
However, “digital identity” and “self-sovereign identity” are
also “buzz” terms. The hopes vested in them could be both
naïve and dangerous, unless accompanied by some significant
rethinking of the crucial basics behind the organization of the
world. In this submission, we will particularly focus on this
tension in connection to the allocation of citizenship and “innate”
individual rights. We argue that when implemented at the
global scale, DLT-based digital identity systems could be deeply
harmful, reinforcing and amplifying some of the most repugnant
1For a detailed technical definition of standards for a decentralized identifier that
is not necessarily based on DLT, see https://www.w3.org/TR/did-core/ (accessed
November 23, 2019).
aspects of contemporary citizenship. While particularly people
from developed countries take their privileged status for granted,
citizenship remains one of the most crucial global instruments
for upholding and reinforcing inequalities through installing
(often impenetrable) barriers in a world where inequalities are
rooted more in space than in class (Milanovic, 2012). Arguably,
manifested in traditional identity management systems such
as passports, glass ceilings are distributed among the human
population, in many ways emerging as the core element of the
contemporary world order. Therefore, one might propose that
such behavior is opposed to the enlightenment ideal of equal
humanworth, the idea of deserving and rationality (Carens, 2015;
Kochenov, 2019), as well as the concept of human dignity, which
is at the core of modern human rights law (Petersen, 2012). In
other words, the current citizenship system can be considered
as a rigid cast system. This claim is supported by empirical
evidence collected and analyzed by Kochenov and Lindeboom
(2019) and Harpaz (2019). If technology is uncritically taking
the side of the current status quo, instead of offering new
rationales to question it, it will most probably emerge as yet
another, immensely effective tool of oppression and injustice.
Given the current trends and ongoing discussions, we perceive
the likelihood of realization of such a grim perspective as high.
Since we are currently living in a world where the majority of
features associated with citizenship amount to liabilities—rather
than bundles of rights as Kochenov (2019) outlines in detail
throughout his monograph—it can be assumed that more and
better identification is not necessarily a desirable way forward.
The improved policing of the random distribution of privilege
with the help of new technologies could result in less justice in
the world.
Some proponents of DLT-based identity systems envisage
“cloud communities” with truly “self-sovereign” individuals
picking and choosing which communities they belong to (Orgad,
2018, pp. 251–260). While there is no universally acknowledged
definition of self-sovereign identity, Allen (2016) has described
it as “[. . . ] the next step beyond user-centric identity and that
means it begins at the same place: the user must be central
to the administration of identity.” Allen goes on to propose
10 principles that should be associated with self-sovereign
identities. Wagner et al. (2018, p. 27) have proposed to define
it as “a model of digital identity where individuals and entities
alike are in full control over central aspects of their digital
identity, including their underlying encryption keys; creation,
registration, and use of their decentralized identifiers [. . . ] The
architecture gives individuals and entities the power to directly
control and manage their digital identity without the need to
rely on external authorities.” In that sense, it is even imaginable
that DLT-based systems would allow individuals to freely choose
the communities they associate themselves with for different
purposes and for a limited time (e.g., You prefer the education
system of country A, but health care in country B suits your needs
better? Why not have both if you meet the basic requirements?).
In this contribution, we propose a governance-focused
categorization of existing approaches to digital identity systems,
use three case studies of existing digital identity systems
to infer opportunities and limitations of DLT-based identity
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specifically, put these in the context of the existing preconditions
of citizenship law, share our broader concerns on recent
developments, and conclude with a suggestion of relevant tests
for DLT-based identity systems that we put forward to avoid the
plunge into a neo-feudal “brave new world”2. While only one
of our digital identity case studies uses DLT, we describe the
other already implemented large-scale digital identity systems to
highlight salient aspects that are also relevant to the development
and use of DLT-based systems. We see tensions embedding
DLT in existing and undeniable power structures, using digital
identities cross-border in a societally meaningful way, and
backing digital identities up using biometrical data as anchor.
DIGITAL IDENTITY AND DISTRIBUTED
LEDGER TECHNOLOGY AS APPLIED AT
THE STATE OR LOCAL LEVEL
As we investigate innovative digital identity programs from a
governance perspective and with a focus on assigning rights and
duties in the public sphere, we can distinguish three categories:
1. Centralized Top-Down; e.g., Aadhaar, India3
2. Individual Incentive Based; e.g., E-Residency, Estonia4
3. Community Based Bottom-Up; e.g., Forus.io/“Kindpakket”,
Netherlands5
Not all of the examples mentioned use DLT or Blockchain as
underpinning technologies. However, since they were built
with digital technologies at the core, even those not using
a Blockchain-like system share common characteristics,
opportunities, and risks relevant for DLT-based and
decentralized identity management systems. It is therefore
useful to consider them in this submission, especially since some
of them have already been implemented in very large scale. In
this section, we will describe the context and main features of
these three categories before outlining the main opportunities
and risks we see.
Example No. 1: Aadhaar
The “Aadhaar” program in India is arguably one of the most
prominent examples of a “Centralized Top-Down” approach to
digital identity management. Since India, while not so highly
developed, is a country with one of the largest populations
worldwide, it understandably presents a considerable challenge to
implement a smoothly working identification mechanism. It was
estimated that, by 2008, the four most frequently used traditional
identity programs in India were passports that were used by
40 million, Permanent Account Numbers (PAN) for use by the
Indian Income Tax Department with 70 million registrations,
the “Ration Card” (issued by states governments to allow for
the purchase of essential commodities such as wheat) with 220
2With reference to Aldous Huxley’s dystopian novel from 1932, where the
allocation of roles in society was strictly predefined and controlled through
advanced technological systems.
3https://uidai.gov.in (accessed August 8, 2019).
4https://e-resident.gov.ee (accessed August 8, 2019).
5https://forus.io (accessed August 8, 2019).
million registrations, and finally 500 million voter IDs issued by
the Electoral Commission (Zelazny, 2012, p. 6). Given these digits
and the knowledge of the current population of India, it is clear
that identification management in India in 2008 was not working
comprehensively covering the entire population. It was and
continues to be difficult for the country to register citizens at birth
(Masiero, 2018, p. 7). In such a situation, digitization is attractive
to build a safer, quicker, more efficient, and transparent system.
The Indian government started to draw up a plan for a new
digital identity in 2006 and founded the Unique Identification
Authority (UIDAI) in 2008 (Zelazny, 2012)6. Subsequently a
Unique Identity (UID) was developed, which consists of 12
numbers. In order to link this identifier to a person, large
amounts of personal data about it and its family are being
collected (e.g., date of birth, parents’ names, etc.). In particular,
the number of biometric measurements is extensive and includes
fingerprints as well as iris scans (Masiero, 2018, p. 4). This
is also relevant for DLT-based digital identity systems, since
the use of biometrics is considered as one possible solution to
link “anonymous” digital wallets containing digital identities to
their rightful owners (De Filippi and Wright, 2018, pp. 14–
16). Although heavily disputed by some developers (Burt, 2019),
biometrics continue to be an option for backup mechanisms
in cases where users lose access to their digital identities, or if
devices storing them have been destroyed or lost. This fits into
a larger trend of increasingly using biometrical information to
identify users on smartphones and mobile devices (Rattani et al.,
2019, pp. 12–18).
At the end of 2018, it was estimated that 90.1% of the Indian
population or more than 1.2 billion individuals were registered
with the system7. Their UIDs are stored and managed in a
centralized database system managed by the UIDAI. Although
the Aadhaar system was lacking a specified list of purposes at
the time of its inception, it was primarily intended to facilitate
the delivery of social welfare (particularly nutrition) and to
address concerns about ineffective distribution of the subsidies or
fraudulent behavior (Masiero, 2018, pp. 6–7). Before turning to
opportunities and risks of Aadhaar and similar Top-Down digital
identity systems, we will continue to introduce case studies for the
second and third category as indicated above.
Example No. 2: Estonian E-Residence
When it comes to digital identity based on individual incentives,
the Estonian E-Residency program has gained a lot of attention8.
Estonia has become one of the most innovative countries in the
area of digital governance over the last decades. To promote the
country as an economic hub within the European Union being
open to business from everywhere, the government launched an
E-Residency program on December 1, 20149. This “new digital
nation” supposedly consists of individuals from across the world
6The UIDAI has a website at: https://uidai.gov.in (accessed August 7, 2019).
7https://uidai.gov.in/images/state-wise-aadhaar-saturation.pdf (accessed August
8, 2019).
8https://e-resident.gov.ee/ (accessed August 8, 2019).
9Identity Documents Act and State Fee Act Amendment Act (Isikut tõendavate
dokumentide seaduse ja riigilõivuseaduse muutmise seadus), RT I, 29 October
2014, 1.
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who decide to establish their business in Estonia (Poleshchuk,
2016). Individuals interested in registering for E-Residence in
Estonia can administrate their business remotely and use Estonia
with its state-of-the-art digital technologies as their hub. They
might consume Estonian services and products along the way,
do business via the Estonian companies they found, and might
eventually wish to move to Estonia, raising the country’s profile.
The program was launched with the target to have 10 million E-
residents by the year 2025. At a later stage, the goal was added
to attract 20,000 companies by the year 2021. On December
1, 2018, Estonia’s population of E-residents is composed of
a∼50,000 people from 157 countries, while a large portion of
this growth reportedly occurred in 2018. Additionally, around
6,000 new companies have established themselves through the
program (Korjus, 2018a). E-Residence essentially first intended
to attempt to offset the deficiency of the original jurisdictions the
E-Residence reside in and of which they hold the citizenship. It
would be premature to report any real success, however: banking
due diligence rules and frequent actual residence requirement
meant that—for example—an Iraqi with an E-Residence is still
first and foremost tied to her country and the possibility of doing
business in or via Estonia is de facto very limited. To potentially
mitigate some of these issues, the Estonian administration
is looking into developing version 2.0 of this program
(Korjus, 2018b).
Example No. 3: Kindpakket
The third category of digital identity programs we propose
to consider consists of “Community Based Bottom-Up”
approaches. Such programs might first seem limited in scope and
impact. Indeed, they focus on significantly smaller populations.
Communities such as the city of Zug in Switzerland (Kohlhaas,
2017) or the community of Zuidhorn/Westerkwartier in the
province of Groningen in the Netherlands have successfully
experimented with digital identity based on DLT in community
settings (Velthuijs, 2018). In the case of the latter, a community
child welfare program was realized (Kindpakket). The identity
of a potential applicant gets stored in a digital wallet that is
controlled through a smartphone application (called “Me”).
Once the identity and the essential credentials are confirmed
by the community/state or a trusted third party (e.g., certifying
notary), the individual can “shop” for benefits that are tendered
in different funds administered by the community or offered
by other benevolent actors (e.g., humanitarian organizations).
If the individual is interested in a specific program or fund
(e.g., childcare benefits) that can be found on a platform, it
is possible to apply directly. One of the additional benefits of
the design of the system is that no raw personal data are being
exchanged in the application process. The technology is able
to assess the application just based on whether the criteria
of the fund meet the credentials of the person. This is made
possible by implementing a method called “Zero Knowledge
Proof” (ZKP). According to Kulkarni (2018, p. 60), “ZKP
allows a user to construct a mathematical proof so that, when
a program is executed on some hidden input known only
to that user, it has a particularly publicly known output, but
without revealing any other information beyond this.” Kulkarni
goes on to explain that ZKP has been further developed with
the emergence of “Zero-knowledge Succinct Non-Interactive
Argument of Knowledge” (Zk-SNARKS), which allows one
to prove something is true without revealing the reason for
why it is true. With the implementation of such technologies
in digital identity systems, the individual gains more control
over the management of her own digital identity: she chooses
under which circumstances she shares personal data, and the
system is designed in a way that limits the exchange of raw
personal data considerably. Therefore, it is often being claimed
that such systems operationalize the concept of self-sovereign
identity, solving the data protection-related “identity crisis”
of the digital age (Toth and Anderson-Priddy, 2019, pp.
17–18). The individual and citizens become less dependent
on intermediaries such as governments or other institutions.
Once the individual meets the requirements, it receives either
currency, or purpose-bound vouchers (“tokens”) that can be
used at merchants or for specific services (e.g., entrance to
public swimming pool, sport lessons, etc.) that the backer of
the fund wants to promote10. Since pilots in this area seem
promising, it is not unlikely that such programs will become
more common in many communities across the world in the
years to come.
Opportunities and Limitations
It has been claimed that Blockchain is a solution searching for
a problem (Frederik, 2018), and in the years 2018 and 2019, the
“disruptive” potential of Blockchain and other DLT is questioned
considerably. In particular, the financial sector seems to be
disappointed after having made significant investments in the
development of “proof of concepts.” In that light, analysts claim
that DLT solutions either work mainly as niche applications
(e.g., supply chain sector), have modernization value replacing
long-outdated systems, or have reputational value guaranteeing
prestige (Higginson et al., 2019). To investigate the usefulness of
DLT-based applications, Zwitter and Boisse-Despiaux (2018, p.
6) have proposed four guiding questions to find out whether DLT
solutions are appropriate for the envisaged use case. Paraphrased,
these are as follows:
1. Do the benefits of a DLT solution justify the costs of
development and the scaling process?
2. Is the application demanding decentralization through
distribution and built-in trust through transparency?
3. Does a ledger created by the application need to
be immutable?
4. Does the final application comply with legal norms, relevant
codes of conducts, ethical principles, and human rights?
If these questions cannot be answered affirmatively, the use of
DLT might be unnecessary and other technologies might be
better to achieve sustainable progress. However, despite these
critical aspects, it is certainly too early to state that DLT as such
have failed. There are still plenty of promising pilot projects11,
10The project has been discussed with the developers in September and
October 2018.
11https://blockchan.ge/curatedexamples.html (accessed August 8, 2019).
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and the technology keeps developing beyond the “original”
Blockchain system underpinning the cryptocurrency Bitcoin,
which, at the time of writing, was already more than 10 years
old (Nakamoto, 2008). In other words, DLT are “not monolithic
concepts,” with changing attributes that offer great potential in
the area of “disintermediation, transparency, and accessibility.”
Therefore, it is still being widely believed that DLT can have a
significant impact in the area of identity management, even if
this might take longer than many have proposed in the past years
(Verhulst and Young, 2018, p. 16).
If we consider the presented case studies and aim at
identifying opportunities, we see the following: First, digitization
of identity clearly offers a venue to be more precise, effective,
and comprehensive in identity management. The sheer number
of issued UIDs under the Aadhaar regime is impressive, and
India might actually have found a tool to comprehensively
issue identities for its entire population for the first time
in its history. Secondly, it seems likely that the cost of
administration of identities can be reduced due to the advantages
of automatization. Thirdly, particularly the use of DLT and the
implementation of the self-sovereign identity concept have the
potential to put the individual in control of its own credentials.
This could result in a profound culture change in an area in which
individuals typically depend on the state, public institutions, or
corporations to administer their identity. This can be enabling
for individuals, offering themmore choice and possibilities as the
Estonian model and the study in Zuidhorn show. Additionally,
many have associated hopes that this will increase the level
of data protection and privacy, reducing the likelihood of
large data breaches containing millions of personal credentials
(Toth and Anderson-Priddy, 2019, pp. 17–18). Fourthly, DLT
seems to facilitate cross-border cooperation. It is imaginable
that not only communities or the state provide funds in the
case of Community Based Bottom-Up approaches, but also
humanitarian organizations or private parties do so to provide
aid in areas that were struck by natural or man-made disaster. All
of these opportunities are significant and explain the interest in
the subject.
Nevertheless, for these opportunities to be realized,
the following limitations need to be overcome: First, the
development of DLT needs to be based on fundamental values
and human rights. This can be tied to “human centered design”
approaches (Giacomin, 2014). Concretely, DLT-based digital
identities need to support governance structures respecting,
protecting, and promoting privacy and more generally the
autonomy of the individual. Poorly designed digital identity
systems can seriously threaten the enjoyment of privacy, as the
Aadhaar example demonstrates. In particular, biometrical data
are very sensitive and difficult to protect with legal frameworks
(Jasserand, 2018, p. 155), and the identifiers used relate to
integral parts of the body of each individual. While it is possible
to start or stop using a key, password, or any other credential
used to create trust, the management of data relating to the
physical shape of a human being requires much more refined
frameworks. In this respect, it is also necessary to consider how
attractive a centralized database containing credentials of more
than 1 billion people is for private parties, as well as all types
of cybercrime, cyberattacks, cyberespionage, or cyberwarfare.
Not only from this perspective, the underlying regulatory and
governance framework of Aadhaar seemed inappropriate since
specified purposes, as well as safeguards and individual remedies
for the use of the system, were not identified in a specific law at
the inception of the system. In a judgment from 26 September
2018, the Indian Supreme Court tried to respond to these
challenges by limiting the purposes the UID has to be used for
(Indian Supreme Court, 2018). Following this judgment, it is no
longer mandatory to use a UID when opening a bank account,
buy mobile phone cards, in an admission process to a school,
or for appearance in boards or common entrance examinations
(Mahapatra, 2018; Privacy International, 2019).
This highlights a second limitation that needs to be addressed.
As powerful as digital identities might be, it is important to make
sure existing governance structures are precise, adequate, and
have the capability to link them to “the real world.” The ambitious
Estonian E-Residence program ran into this limitation at the
point at which individuals started to apply for bank accounts
in the country. Tax authorities and other actors along the value
creation chain find it currently difficult to work with digital
identity, which in turn makes these identities practically useless.
Estonia aims at addressing this issue in version 2.0 of the E-
Residence program (Korjus, 2018b), but the underlying issue
here might be the different requirements in different areas of
the regulatory space (e.g., Anti-money-laundering frameworks),
which all have to be proportionate and aligned in order for
digital identity to work (Kaiser, 2018, pp. 578–587). Community-
Based Bottom-Up approaches seem to be less sensitive to this
problem since the scope of their operations is smaller and the
technology is applied “closer” to the individual, which allows
one to tailor it more carefully, taking the concrete problems
into account.
A third limitation we see is the impact on the development
of groups and social equality in general. While the Indian
government has claimed that Aadhaar particularly helps the poor,
careful observers such as Usha Ramanathan claim that inaccurate
use of biometric data, the spreading mandatory nature of the
UID, and other shortfalls create challenges for weak and sick
people living in rural areas and can result in life-threatening
situations for members of the transgender community or others
whose identity may now be clear, but still not accepted widely in
society (Bhardwaj, 2018). The datafication of social interaction
reshapes the relationship not only between the individual and
the government but also between groups and the rest of society
(Taylor et al., 2017, pp. 226–235). Possibly, this aspect raises
one of the most important aspects when discussing digital
identities and the use of DLT in this area. If digital identities
will fully replace existing concepts such as citizenship, they will
not be able to do so in an environment that is free of customs,
traditions, and power structures. This has also significant
implications for deciding how centralized or decentralized the
architecture of a DLT-based digital identity system can be. A
fully decentralized system might be potentially empowering for
the individual on the one hand, but the necessity to keep
the link to society (and the resources it controls) remains on
the other.
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DIGITAL IDENTITY AT THE GLOBAL
LEVEL: TOTALITARIAN NEO-FEUDALISM
What would happen if DLT-based digital identity was applied
globally and became the standard tool of choice, eventually
digitizing citizenship? To develop an answer to this question,
it is useful to clarify that citizenship does not depend on the
need of documenting identity, which many of the predominantly
technology-focused proponents arguably aspire to solve. Virtual
nations or “cloud communities,” as long as they aim at replicating
existing national structures, will probably make the world worse
off, particularly those individuals who are less privileged already.
The framing of this complex topic that academics such as Orgad
(2018, pp. 251–260) propose seems unhelpful, especially in the
context of his aspirational concept of a “global” citizenship,
and leaving beside what such a global citizenship would
ultimately mean in detail. If digital identity management driven
predominantly by concerns relating to technological feasibility
was to replace traditional identity management and citizenship,
this arguably random segregation of the global population
into relatively closed groups of varying value will continue
(Kochenov, 2019). Some of these DLT-based digital identities—
just as currently citizenship—will come with far-reaching rights,
whereas others will predominantly represent liabilities. Hence,
digitized identity management will first and foremost make this
segregation process more granular, and effective.
To illustrate this with a concrete example, if someone is
assigned a humiliating set of liabilities in real life—e.g., a
Central African Republic citizenship—instead of a noble and
democratic status—e.g., citizenship of France—virtual nations
will not change anything from the perspective of individual
rights and human dignity. The lack of any rights worldwide
coming with some citizenships as opposed to a bundle of rights
coming with others can be measured. By comparing the gross
domestic product (GDP), Human Development Index (HDI),
travel freedom, settlement, and work rights abroad, it is easy
to see why being French—a status welcoming you to the job
market of 41 countries—is infinitely better than being a citizen of
the Central African Republic (Kochenov and Lindeboom, 2017,
2019). Hence, the actual problem derives from already existing
real-world inequalities between identities and citizenships. It is
not only that citizenships by definition exclude, the difference
between citizenshipsmatters (Kochenov, 2018, pp. 321–324). The
question is how the digitization of identity management will
implicitly or explicitly affect and interact with this reality.
To elaborate on this point, citizenship’s core function
throughout history has been to establish and police global race-
and wealth-based hierarchies. This unfolds in many different
perspectives, such as gender: it took US women almost a 100
years to get the right to vote, and women in the Swiss canton
of Appenzell-Innerrhoden had to wait until 1991 and a decision
of the Federal Supreme Court was necessary (Swiss Federal
Supreme Court, 1990). Compared with women in “developed
countries,” individuals living in colonial territories fared even
worse. While African Americans have not been enjoying the
same rights as “Caucasian” US citizens historically, the same
is true for those with different ethnic backgrounds living in
European and Asian empires. Emmanuelle Saada has researched
how arbitrary—based entirely on skin color—the ascription of
French citizenship in the colonies of the Republic was (Saada,
2012). After decolonization was finished following the Second
World War, the former colonial subjects are now confined to
places around the world reserved uniquely for the losers of Ayelet
Shachar’s infamous “birthright lottery” (Shachar, 2009). Hence,
the world has both changed and remained the same. It changed,
because in the second half of the 20th century, the Western
world has started to accept women’s rights. Furthermore, racial
and indigenous minorities within “first world” states are also
respected in many cases. Nevertheless, in other aspects, the
world has remained the same. Milanovic (2012) has outlined
that inequalities can now been found between states, rather than
within national borders. Hannah Arendt’s concept of a “right to
have rights” citizenship for individuals who would otherwise be
stateless is a status associated with rights in a handful of countries
only (Oman, 2010, pp. 280–289). In many others, it is a severe
and undeserved liability with sometimes fatal consequences.
Those locked into the poorest former colonies do not inhabit
the same narrative as privileged individuals of the global north.
Citizenships are thus about preserving inequality worldwide. If
cloud communities, digital identity projects, and virtual nations
do not address this issue in their design, these fundamental
realities will remain the same.
In other words, before considering potential benefits of a
set of quasi-citizenships and the deployment of digital identity
to create virtual nations, it is crucial to be fully aware of the
drastic differences between citizenships in “real life.” This has
to be considered in the light that many see digital identities
as an opportunity to fully “identify” populations in countries
that fail to register individuals at birth, or comprehensively
throughout their lives. To be identifiable is not necessarily
“a good thing.” If the development and deployment of DLT-
based digital identities do not recognize and take into account
the circumstances, the promised benefits will remain a dream,
and digitized identity management might ultimately see a
considerable societal push-back.
CONCLUSION: A HOLISTIC ASSESSMENT
OF DIGITAL IDENTITY
Coming back to the start of this submission, and the question
how a “good” digital identity can be achieved, we hope to have
convincingly made the point that such an achievement can only
be realized if the current culture and understanding of identity
and citizenship can be significantly improved. In other words,
what is needed for true and meaningful progress is technology-
enabled change of the status quo (Grinbaum and Groves, 2013,
pp. 139–140), rather than the mere and value-neutral digitization
of existing paradigms and power structures. Potentially, such
an attempt to provide an ethically sound version of digital
identity can also be inspired by the discussion around the ethical
valuable use of artificial intelligence (Gath, 2018). Unless this
cannot be guaranteed by the proponents and implementing
actors of DLT-based identities, it might be overall better for
society to stick with the current systems despite their “gray”
areas and incomplete features. In the end, this might result in
Frontiers in Blockchain | www.frontiersin.org 6 March 2020 | Volume 3 | Article 10
Gstrein and Kochenov Digital Identity: Progress or Pitfall?
more freedom and opportunities for the individuals concerned
and enable more societal development than artificially restricting
frameworks based on immature technological systems.
Nevertheless, we believe that digital identities based on DLT
have potential if designed in the right way. For example, the
GENESIS Design principles for Blockchange seem capable as
guidelines (Verhulst and Young, 2018, pp. 74–77). The acronym
is composed of (G)overnance legitimacy based on (E)thically
sound intentions. The aim should be to produce solutions for
real problems, (N)ot to promote technology as such. In this
submission, we have shown that the Community-Based Bottom-
Up approach seems particularly promising in this respect. This
may also be one of the main reasons why the studies in this
area deliver immediately tangible and solid results. Still, the
(E)cological footprint of DLT-based systems remains an open
question (De Vries, 2018, p. 804). However, as mentioned earlier
in this submission, we think that it is important to keep in mind
that DLT are still developing and, as other technologies in the
past, might also get more energy effective over time. In particular,
as we follow the discussion about the transition of “Proof of
Work” to “Proof of Stake” consensus mechanisms, this seems not
unlikely (Xu, 2018). The next principle is aimed at making sure
that DLT use is (S)ynchronized with existing initiatives. We have
alluded to this aspect in this submission at various stages, but
believe that particularly the four-step test proposed by Zwitter
and Boisse-Despiaux (2018) adds a useful perspective to this
consideration. Additionally, when designing identity systems,
(I)nteroperability and open standards are crucial to avoid vendor
lock-in or dependence on large players. It is hard to imagine a
truly self-sovereign identity based on proprietary technological
standards. Finally, the last principle is to (S)ecure first block
accuracy, which can also be interpreted as making sure that
once personal data (especially biometrical data) are put on an
immutable ledger, these data are accurate and do not cause
unnecessary harm for the respective individual or citizen.
To conclude, we suggest that implementing DLT-based
systems for identity management needs a holistic approach
taking all of the aforementioned aspects into account and putting
them at the center of the design process of applications. As
we aimed at demonstrating throughout, it seems particularly
useful to take into account existing knowledge, inequalities, and
the limitations of citizenship law. Since the Centralized Top-
Down approach and Individual Incentive programs particularly
tend to make overgeneralized assumptions on individual (and
collective) identity, we see less space for their success in the short-
to mid-term. Still, we believe that it is useful to consider the
development of such systems since they provide the background
for a discussion on what identity should and could mean in the
Digital Age. Nevertheless, the immediate future seems to belong
to Bottom-Up digital identity approaches with their ability
to improve gradually and incrementally, taking the complex
social environment into account on a much more granular and
practical level.
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